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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NLRB ORDERS: THE ROLE OF
INARTICULATE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS*
KEITH W. BLINN**

One of the most fascinating branches of administrative law is judicial
review of administrative determinations. In this area one is able to observe
the pressures and pulls between the divisions of government. Frequently,
one feels a sense of battle.' The judiciary is not unmindful that, due in
part to its own shortcomings, areas over which it had exclusive jurisdiction
are controlled now by administrative agencies. It is aware that new techniques have been developed and these have not always been patterned
after judicial procedures. When legislative judgments have been translated
into terms of administrative orders, they have not always been cheerfully
accepted; sometimes, they have been dissipated or nullified, and this under
the guise of some traditional legal doctrine. This attitude has been not
uncommonly reflected in the intemperate language of the reviewing court
in reversing an administrative agency in the language of broad constitutional principles as contrasted with a far more conciliatory tone of "reversible error" when upsetting the judgment of a lower judicial body because
of similar errors.2 In epithetical jurisprudence a similar approach is represented by such phrases as "administrative absolutism."
For one interested in policy and the implementation to the fullest
extent of the basic values of the community, the practice of exercising
judicial scrutiny over administrative determinations raises a number of
questions. For what objectives, by what methods and under what conditions should the reviewing court substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative tribunal? To appraise rationally the achievements or shortcomings of judicial review of administrative determinations in terms of
community policy objectives, one must seek to clarify in general terms
the basic community objectives of such judicial review. Intervention by
the judiciary should be designed to give litigants access to formal authority
*This article reflects solely the opinion of the author and not those of any government agency with which he has been or is presently connected.
*"A.B. 1939, University of Kansas; LL.B. 1941, Marquette University; Sterling
Fellow, Yale University, 1950-51; Member of the Tennessee, Wisconsin, Missouri and
North Dakota Bars; Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law;
Attorney-Adviser, Office of Price Stabilization, 1951; Attorney, National Labor Relations
Board, 1942-47; Attorney, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1942; Chairman, Regional Enforcement Commission, Wage Stabilization Board (8th Region).
1.A dear statement of this philosophy appears in Freund's admonishment, "Discretionary administrative power over individual rights . . . is undesirable per se and
should be avoided as far as may be, for discretion is unstandardized power and to lodge
in an official such power over person or property is hardly conformable to the 'Rule of
Law'."
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to test the behavior of the administrative tribunal officials for their conformance to prescribed standards and to secure the application of community coercion for maintaining such conformance. More expressly,
judicial review should serve to guarantee that administrative decisions are
made according to the prescribed substantive policies of the community;
that they are formulated through fair procedures but with as much
economy to all parties as is consistent with other procedural values, such
respect for human dignity and maximization of the enlightenment process;
and that they make the greatest possible use of administrative expertness,
including full use of scientific "know how" for the ascertainment of facts.
While various administrative agencies, involving the whole range of
community values and all institutional contexts, present related problems,
this article will consider some of the inarticulate policy considerations of
judicial review in the context of industrial relations within the framework
of the Natonal Labor Relations Board.
Realizing that orders of the National Labor Relations Board are not
self-executing and depend almost wholly upon the court of appeals to
bring effective community coercion to bear upon the non-complying
respondent through the court's contempt powers, one recognizes immediately a distinction between review of this administrative determination
and the review of an ordinary judicial determination by a lower court.
The court of appeals may receive the case either through the device of a
petition for a decree to enforce the Board's order or through a petition
by the respondent to modify or set aside the order. Thus, it is apparent
that the usual dichotomy, which is characteristic of the judicial review of
lower court determinations where the petitioning party seeks to upset the
decision below, does not pertain in the case of judicial review of NLRB
decisions since usually the Board, as petitioner, will be seeking approval of
its own determination.
Interpretation of the statutory tone for judicial review under the
Wagner Act was set at rest during the early days of the Board. Thus,
"... findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported
by evidence shall be conclusive" was held to mean substantial evidence
and "more than a mere scintilla" but "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."14 It was also
expressed in terms that ". .. [i]t must be enough to justify, if the trial
were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to
be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." 5 This is to be contrasted to
the weight given to the findings of a judge without a jury, which findings
may be overturned when they are "clearly erroneous."8 Admittedly, "the
3. 49 STAT. 454 (1935).
4. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
5. NLRB v. Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).

6. Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 701, 702 (1944).
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very smoothness of the 'substantial evidence' formula as a standard for
reviewing the evidentiary validity of the Board's findings established its
currency." 7
Following passage of the Administrative Procedure Act providing
that agency findings should be set aside by the reviewing court if "...
unsupported by substantial evidence . . ." which determinations should
be made upon ". . . the whole record or such portions thereof as may be
cited by any party . ..*"and passage of the Taft-Hartley Act providing
that "the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall
be conclusive," 9 the court of appeals differed as to whether judicial control
over administrative determinations had been broadened. 10 Conceding that
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act provide for the
same extent of judicial scrutiny, the particularly unique aspect of the
Universal Camera case" is that the Supreme Court indicated that the law
with respect to the scope of judicial review had been changed by the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, 12
while government counsel were urging that no change had been wrought
since the law had been what the Court now asserts is the correct "mood."' 3
Admitting that at most its previous decisions when interpreted may have
led to an assumption that the reviewing court would have discharged its
duty when it found support in the record by viewing a portion of the
evidence in isolation, the Court hastened to suggest that it had not
approved or condoned such limited review by adding, "This is not to say
that every member of this Court was consciously guided by this view or
that the Court ever explicitly avowed this practice as doctrine."' 4 Although
Dean Stason believed that some reviewing courts had on occasion sustained
the Board's findings while viewing in isolation the evidence favorable to
such findings, 15 other able writers suggested that "[o]bviously responsible
men would not exercise their judgment on only that part of the evidence
that looks in one direction; the rationality or substantiality of a conclusion
7. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).

8. 60 STAT. 224, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1946).
9. 61 STAT. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (Supp. 1950)
10. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950). Contra.
NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
11. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 7.

12. Professor Davis suggests that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
demonstrated a much clearer desire for change than did the legislative history of the
Administrative Procedure Act. In fact, be argues that the Supreme Court ignored
certain strong evidence that no change was envisioned by the Administrative Procedure
Act. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 871 n. 19 (1951). For a view that judicial review
was broadened as to facts and law by the Administrative Procedure Act see Dickinson,
Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened judicial Review, 33
A.B.A.J. 434 (1947).
13. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 7, at 487.

14. Id. at 478.

15. Stason, Substantial Evidence in Administrative Law, 89 U. oF PA. L. REV.
1026, 1049-50 (1941).
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can only be evaluated in the light of the whole fact situation or so much
of it as appears."' 0 At least one court of appeals which had interpreted
the new statutes as not changing the scope of review expressed the view
that no change in their approach to judicial review of NLRB orders was
necessary despite the contrary view of the Supreme Court since "[i]n
making pragmatic application of the substantial evidence rule, [they had]
always recognized ultimate responsibility for the rationality of the Board's
decision .. ."17
In their broadest categorization, the problems presented to the court
in reviewing NLRB orders are those of employer unfair labor practices and
union unfair labor practices. These may be described in terms of the right of
labor organizations to obtain statutory status as the collective bargaining
representative, the right of the employees to be free from employer or
labor organization restraint and coercion in connection with their right
to form, join or assist labor organizations or to refrain from such activity,
and the right of the employer to be free from certain detrimental union
activity. In a lower level of abstraction the range of issues may include
simply deciding who said what in disputed factual claims,' determination
of the area of the employer's responsibility for the actions of supervisors
and third persons," deciding the reason which motivated the employer's
discharge of
an employee,20 interpretation of statutory terms such as
"employee, '" 2 determination of the appropriate bargaining unit for the
23
22
purposes of collective bargaining, determination of substantive policy
and procedure24 which will effectuate the policies of the Act and fashioning
the scope of the particular remedy. 25 A relevant inquiry would be whether
there are any discernible articulated policies in the tendency of the court
to substitute judgment based upon such a categorization of issues.
16. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 HARv.

L. Rev. 704, 733 (1943).
17. NLRB v. Tri-State Casualty Ins. Co., 188 F.2d 50, 53 (10th Cir. 1951).
18. NLRB v. Continental Pipe Line Co., 161 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1947); NLRB
v. Winona Knitting Mills, 163 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1947).
19. NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941); NLRB v. American Furnace
Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.2d
311 (8th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F,2d 243 (9th Cir. 1944).
20. NLRB v. Premier Worsted Mills, 183 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. May

Dep't Stores Co., 162 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 808 (1947).
21. NLRB v. E.C. Atkins Co., 331 U.S. 398, rehearing denied, 331 U.S. 868
(1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. I11 (1944); NLRB v. Blount, 131
F.2d 585 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943).
22. NLRB v. Falk Corp., 307 U.S. 453 (1940); NLRB v. West Kentucky Coal
Co.,'152 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946); Note, 28 CEo. L.
REv. 666 (1940).
23. Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951).
24. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1947); NLRB v. Conlon Bros.
Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949); Semi-Steel Casting Co. of St. Louis v.
NLRB, 160 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 758 (1947).
25. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); May Dep't Stores Co. v.
NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1946); NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).

REVIEW OF NLRB ORDERS

It has been commonly thought that in the absence of a statutory
limitation on the time within which a petition for review could be filed,
failure to seek review promptly did not preclude such a right.26 The lapse
of time between the issuance of the Board's order and the petition for
enforcement may be explained by a good faith attempt to secure informal
compliance with the Board's order and thus obtain conformance to community standards through volition, rather than resort to the formal authority
of the court. Other equally acceptable and unnovel excuses might include
simply a lack of legal personnel in the briefing section of the Board's
enforcement staff. Under any circumstances, the respondent who has his
own avenue for seeking review is in no position to urge a delayed enforcement as an element of unfairness. Standing almost alone is the Eanet27
case which reiterates the obvious: that enforcement power was not given
to the Board but was reposed as a judicial function in the court. The court
refused to enforce an order requiring the company to bargain without
some "reasonable recent indication that a decree was warranted," cautioning that, "law enforcement is an art and not a mere unthinkable application of mathematical absolutes."
As statutory judicial review of administrative determinations developed,
courts adopted convenient tags to indicate the degree of readiness or
reluctance with which they would substitute their own judgments for those
of the administrative tribunal. These tags, originally cast in terms of
questions of fact or questions of law, indicated polar extremes of judicial
readiness to substitute judgment but were soon expanded to include other
terms of mixed questions of law and fact,28 jurisdictional fact,29 and constitutional fact.30 The first indicated a middle ground of judicial intervention and the latter two were used to justify complete readiness to
substitute judgment. This transposes the problem of judicial review into
one of determining into which category the issue will fall. Certain issues
may be clearly categorized upon purely logical analysis into fact or law,
but many defy such clear determination. A learned writer suggested, "The
judges, who have the last word, can confidently draw the line between
law and fact; for the rest of us it is not so easy." 31 If the criteria of substituted judgment depends on whether the issue is one of fact or law, the
real difficulty lies in the accuracy of this classification-especially in the
shaded area between law and fact or what is often called mixed questions
26. NLRB v. Poor Mfg. Co., 339
705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
121 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941).
27. NLRB v.Eanet, 179 F.2d 15
28. Schwartz, Mixed Questions of
Act, 19 FORD. L. REv. 73(1950).
29. Black, The JurisdictionalFact

L.Q. 349 (1937).

U.S. 577 (1950); NLRB v. Todd Co., 173 F.2d
864 (1949); NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co.,
(D.C.Cir. 1949).
Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure
Theory and Administrative Finality, 22 CORNELL

30. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations
of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. of PA. L. REv. 1055 (1932).
31. CARR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 108 (1941).
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of law and fact. Whether particular statements were made or particular
acts were done is a question of fact but assuming that such facts are
undisputed, the question as to whether or not they amount to an unfair
labor practice is a question of law. 32 Yet few would advocate a complete
de novo review of even the latter question. As Justice Jackson describes
the dilemma, "Perhaps the chief difficulty in consistent and uniform
compliance with the congressional limitation upon court review lies in the
want of a certain standard for distinguishing 'questions of law' from
'questions of fact'."33 Approaching the problem by considering the relative
competence of the administrative tribunal and the court to make the
particular determination suggests the need for a more rational division
of power than the artificiality of factual and legal issues. However, it is
believed that various rather inarticulate policy considerations play a more
important role in the scope of judicial review than is generally realizedmore than do some of the conceptualistic categorizations. Such a suggestion was made by the Attorney General's Commission on Administrative
final report after studying a number of federal administraProcedure in its
4
tive agencies.8
Since the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, the organizational structure of the NLRB has been
almost unique; 35 the amendments effected a more than usual separation
between prosecuting and adjudicating functions by the establishment of
an independent office of General Counsel. In addition, the utilization of
a Review Division for reviewing the examiner's intermediate reports, which
is not uncommon in the techniques of administrative procedures, was
eliminated by Section 4(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act: "The Board may not
employ any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing transcripts of hearings
or preparing drafts of opinions except that any attorney employed for
assignment as a legal assistant to any Board member may for such Board
member review such transcripts and prepare such drafts." To further
insulate the Board from the prosecuting functions, it was provided that
the examiner's report could not be reviewed by any person other than a
Board member or his legal assistant and that no trial examiner could
consult with or advise the Board with respect to exceptions taken to his
findings, rulings or recommendations. Likewise, the amendments strategically placed the agency in a more neutral position by creating a series
of union unfair labor practices so that the Board stands as protector of
32. "Negligence, like ownership, is a complex conception. Just as the latter
imports the existence of certain facts and the consequence . .. which the law attaches
to those facts, so the former imports the existence of certain facts . . . and also the
consequence which the law attaches to those facts." HoLMEs, COMMON LAW 115
(1881).
33. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 500 (1943) in which the Court
described the lower court's error as ". . . treating as a rule of law what we think is
only a question of proper tax accounting."
34. FINAL REP. ATT'Y GEN. COMm. AD. PROC. 91 (1941).

35. Comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 465 (1951); Note, 34 IowA L. REv. 667 (1949).
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the employees' rights of self organization from both the employer and
the union. The Supreme Court noted the importance of such factors in
reviewing a decision of the Tax Court30 as it commented that "[the tax
court] is independent, and its neutrality is not clouded by prosecuting
duties. Its procedures assure fair hearings. Its deliberations are evidenced
by careful opinions. All guides to judgment available to judges are
habitually consulted and respected." However, the normally anticipated
impact of this separation has not been discernible in the reported decisions
reviewing Labor Board orders. On the contrary, the Red Spot Electric Co.8 7
case indicates a restrictive interpretation of Section 10(e) of the NLRA,
which limits court consideration of objections to those which have been
urged before the Board, its member, agent or agency, by holding it sufficient that an objection was raised before the examiner during the hearing.
In the court's opinion the whole structure of the law demanded judicial
consideration when an enforcement order was sought regardless of whether
any contention as to this issue was urged before the reviewing court.
In assessing the weight to be given to the Board's determination, the
court will scrutinize the record with greater care where the Board has
failed to adopt or has overruled the examiner's findings and recommendations. In the Ohio Associated Telephone Co.' s case, the respondent
contended that the strikers were discharged because of misconduct. This
reason was accepted by the examiner. The Board reversed the examiner,
basing its decision on the fact that the evidence relied on by the examiner
was hearsay. The court refused to enforce the Board's order holding that
the evidence was not hearsay and commenting, "'Evidence supporting a
conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner
who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when lie has reached the same
conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with
the consistency and inherent probability of the testimony. ..

.'

In giving

consideration to the whole record as now we are obliged to do, we may not
disregard the superior advantages of the examiner who heard and saw the
witnesses for determining their credibility, and so for ascertainment of
the truth." Related to this factor may be the lack of unanimity of the
Board or a disagreement among the members as to their findings or recommendations. The reviewing court's determination that the order has a
rational basis in the record is not an abstract determination which is
unaffected by the certitude with which the Board resolved conflicting
issues. Thus, while the reported decisions fail to specify this as a concrete
element of their decision, its relevancy as a factor playing a role in judicial
consideration seems probable since such facts are reflected in the court's
36. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943).
37. NLRB v. Red Spot Electric Co., 191 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1951).
38. Ohio Associated Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1951).
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statement of the case where there has been a disagreement among the
Board members.""
Another factor is the degree of confidence that the court has in the
impartiality of the examiners and the agency. This will be a close index
to the inclination of the court to accept the agency's judgment rather than
substituting its own judgment. The Supreme Court recognized this as an
ingredient of the total process when it observed, "[Slince the court below
had originally found that the Board's order was vitiated by the examiner's
bias, we must take care that the court has not been influenced by that
feeling, however unconsciously, on reconsidering the record now legally
freed from such imputation."40 Throughout the entire history of the Board's
operations, the question as to the fairness and impartiality of the examiners
and the Board members has been a matter of some dispute.4 1 In the Ray
Smith Transport42 case the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
refused to enforce a reinstatement order and expressed a serious lack of
confidence in the agency judgment because of the unjudicial attitude of
the examiner which was critically described as follows: "[I]t was this
attitude, so evident in the long and argumentative report of the examiner,
couched in the language not of adjudication, but of advocacy. . . ."4" The
court did not find the examiner's conduct sufficiently bad to remand the
case to the Board but rather decided the case on the merits using the
examiner's conduct as a part of the whole record and holding that the
findings were without reasonable support in the record. With respect
to the evidence the court concluded, ". . it is at once evident that to
the mind of the examiner, the burden was not on the Board to prove that
.. .[the discharges] . . . were for union activity, but on the Respondent
to prove that they were for cause, and also, that to his eager credulity,
straws in the wind, offered in support of the Board's case, became hoops
of steel, and trifles light as air were confirmations strong as proofs from
Holy Writ." 44 In a case45 before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, enforcement of a reinstatement order was denied because the
findings were "based merely on hearsay, inference and suspicion . ..not
39. NLRB v. John Deere Plow Co., 187 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1951).
40. NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 501 (1951).
41. Cellhorn and Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations, 39 CoL. L. REV. 339, 394
(1939); Thomas, The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and
the Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431 (1950); particularly interesting are the
cartoons in BRooxs, UNIONS OF TlhEIR OWN CIOOSING c.l, The Board at XVork (1939).
42. NLRB v. Ray Smith Transport Co., 193 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1951).
43. What may appear to be argumentative to one court may be to another court a
careful description of the reasoning process which was the basis of the determination.
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforcing a reinstatement order
based upon the examiner's findings, accepting the version given by the Board's witness
and rejecting the version given by the company witness, states, "The Examiner's report
explains why he thought Mr. Jones' testimony unreliable. . . . When an issue turns on
credibility of witnesses, the Examiner's findings are especially entitled to respect."
NLRB v. Chautauqua Hardware Corp., 192 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1951).
44. NLRB v. Ray Smith Transport Co., supra note 42, at 144 (5th Cir. 1951).
45. NLRB v. Russell Mfg. Co., 191 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1951).
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on substantial and legal evidence." On the other hand, an earlier case46
before this court enforcing a reinstatement order against respondent's
contention that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence,
the court in a per curiam decision described the report of the trial examiner
as exhibiting ".

.

. throughout not only a thorough understanding and

appreciation of the effect of the evidence but a most commendable judicial
' 47
approach to and handling of the issues presented.
Closely connected with the court's confidence in the agency is the
matter of procedural safeguards falling short of those considered desirable
by the reviewing court. In the Bradley Washfountain45 case, the Board's

order reinstating certain strikers was based on the theory that the strike
was an unfair labor practice strike since it was caused by the employer's
refusal to bargain with the union and was prolonged through its unlawful
back-to-work movement. The court denied enforcement and found that
the company had not refused to bargain by granting part of a wage
increase requested by the union without consulting the union after having
been unwilling to agree to its demand for a wage increase and that, viewing
the record as a whole, the back-to-work movement was made in good
faith. The substituted judgments were not redeterminations of what was
said but of the effect of what was said. It is worthy to note that the court
had found the Board's complaint wanting in "procedural due process" 49
since it failed to apprise the respondent of the issues; however, the court
preferred not to dispose of the case on this ground because of its conclusions on the merits of the case.
The area in which the National Labor Relations Board operates is
highly charged with ernotions and deep prejudices. Whether it is an area
requiring special training, skill and knowledge is disputed. 0 While answers
to problems posed in the field of industrial relations may appear to be
less complex and to submit to easier solutions than problems in the fields
of taxation and physics, the truly workable solution to industrial relations
problems frequently calls for the amalgamation of such disciplines as
economics, psychology, and sociology. That industrial relations problems
are not just "legal problems" was carefully pointed out by Professor Wirtz
in a critique of present methods of teaching labor law as he cautioned
that there are ".

.

. too many practicing LL.B.'s contributing more to labor

management dissension than accord, too many black-robed alumni forcing
three cornered social problems into the round holes of hand-me-down
46. NLRB v. Augusta Chemical Co., 187 F.2d 63 (Sth Cir. 1951).

47. Id. at 64.
48. NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951).
49. Id. at 148.
50. Asher, The Lawyer in the Field of Labor, 20 Miss. L.J. 454 (1949); Howlett,
The Lawyer's Function in the Field of Labor Relations, 20 TENN. L. REv. 137 (1948);
Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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common law. .

.

"1

Although the pattern is inconsistent, there is a

thread running through the decisions acknowledging, in part, a special
competency through experience on the part of the Board to make determinations within the area of industrial relations. 5 2 In a case raising the
question whether a union was a tainted successor to an admittedly companydominated union, Judge Learned Hand observed that this issue was
distinguishable from a mere determination as to what actuated an employer
to discharge an employee, on which issue the court was equally as competent as the Board to make a determination, but that ".

.

. the question of

how deeply an employer's relations with his employees will overbear their
will, and how long that influence will last, is, or at least it may be thought
to be, of another sort, to decide which a Board, or tribunal chosen from
those who have had long acquaintance with labor relations, may acquire a
competence beyond that of any court."5 3 The Board's experience and
knowledge within the field of industrial relations was sufficient to justify
the adoption of a presumption of interference based upon a company's
promulgation and enforcement of a non-solicitation rule on company
property during non-working hours. 54 Particularly in the determination of
the appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of collective bargaining,
the courts have attributed great weight to the Board's administrative
determination. Judicial reference to the Board's competence, based upon
its long experience in this area, is usually cast in terms of the broad discretion given the Board by the NLRA. In reviewing unit determinations,
the court will substitute its judgment only where the administrative determination has been arbitrary and capricious. 5 The courts are well aware
that a large number of administrative unit problems are the result of
consent determinations and that a readiness on the part of the court to
substitute judgment in this area would open the flood gates for a vast
number of cases and consequently throw a heavy burden on the courts."
Thus, the courts have been willing for the Board to develop criteria for
these unit questions based upon other collective bargaining experience and
industrial patterns. A similar reputation for competence might have been
developed in the area of fashioning remedies. However, the stereotyping
51. Wirtz, On Teaching Labor Law, 42 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1947).
52. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
53. NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1943).
54. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 804 (1945).
55. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, rehearing denied, 331
U.S. 868, motion denied, 332 U.S. 823 (1947); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485 (1947); NLRB v. Conlon Bros. Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.
1951); NLRB v. Underwood Machinery Co., 179 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1950).
56. Something of the potential vastness of the work is indicated by the Board's
Annual Report: "During the 1950 fiscal year, 9,279 petitions for representation elections
were filed in the Board's offices. During this period, the Board conducted 5,731
representation elections in which 899,848 employees were eligible to vote. . . . More
than 72 per cent of the elections was conducted by agreement of the parties. ...
The Board Members, however, were called upon to make decisions in 2,483 representation cases during the year." 15 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 30 (1951).
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of remedial action, together with the judicial awareness that it was the
violation of their decree which was the subject of contempt action, caused
the courts to substitute judgment to circumscribe the area which must be
policed to one which has been the subject of a finding on past conduct. 57
An early tendency to extend the Board's discretion in this area was
rationalized on the grounds that the NLRA commanded the Board "to
effectuate the policies of the Act" and thus it was ". . . for the Board not
the courts to determine how the effect of prior unfair labor practices may
be expunged." 58 But the distinction between how and what was not always
clear since the former frequently merged into the latter.
The above discussion serves to illustrate not in an exhaustive research
but in a suggestive approach that judicial review rationally appraised must
be considered in the realistic light of but a segment of the total decisional
process. The end function of the total decisional process is intelligible only
when it is realized that it is a means by which the decision maker starts
not with answers and seeks to demonstrate their truth but with conflicting
claims of the parties, and that it is the procedure for ascertaining the best
possible answers. These best possible answers sought by the decision maker
involve a composite ascertainment of truth from the conflicting claims, to
which is applied the community standard to effectuate community substantive policy through procedures which meet community standards of
"fair play." It appears that the withholding of substituted judgment by
the reviewing court is not solely based upon the ambiguous law-fact
dichotomy but rather is conditioned to a large degree by vague abstractions
which may be oriented into variables of more concrete statement. These
rather inarticulate policy considerations may be categorized as the organizational structure of the administrative agency with reference to the separation
of its prosecuting and decisional functions; the complexity of the issue and
the relative competence of the court and the agency to decide the question;
the confidence which th5 agency enjoys in the eyes of the reviewing court;
the nature of the sanction and its impact upon the sanctioned party; the
extent to which failure to impose self-limitation will throw an undue
burden of the agency's responsibility on the reviewing courts;5 9 and the
agency's failure to observe what is considered "fair play," particularly
where there is a marked departure from a semblance of "judicial process."
Such a frank recognition of these factors in the reviewing process may seek
to assist in the problem which Justice Frankfurter described in the follow57. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 321 U.S. 426 (1941); NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward Co., 192 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1951).
58. International Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
59. Compare enforcement of Wage Stabilization Board regulations through administrative enforcement commissions which apply sanctions through other executive
branches of government such as Bureau of Internal Revenue, Office of Price Stabilization
and National Production Authority. WSB Resolution No. 35, 16 Fio. RFc. 7284
(July 25, 1951).
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ing words: "There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of
judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this
problem, the use of undefined defining words." 60

60. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 7, at 489.

